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Abstract 
 The rise to prominence of Daesh and their expert exploitation of extremist propaganda has brought 
in to focus the role of strategic communications in counter-terrorism (CT) and countering violent 
extremism policy. Nonetheless, strategic communications tends to be discussed largely in relation to 
counter recruitment and counter radicalisation. Using the UK’s CT strategy as a case study, Alastair 





The value of strategic communications to counterterrorism (CT) appears to be widely 
accepted. In some governments, it is explicitly recognised as a preferred approach: both the 
US and the UK, for example, have invested in institutions devoted to CT strategic 
communications. Academics have long recognised that terrorism ‘is not simply violence but 
communication’,1 and research has increasingly focused not only on how terrorists 
communicate but also on what works in response. Researchers, practitioners – in 
government, the private sector and NGOs – and policymakers therefore seem to be in 
alignment. 
However, there are important and concerning gaps and misconceptions among 
academics and practitioners. Most fundamentally, what CT and countering violent extremism 
(CVE) practitioners in government and beyond like to call ‘strategic communications’ is not, 
in fact, strategic at all; and as a result, strategic communications tends to focus on recruitment 
propaganda and countering radicalisation at the expense of how it may be used to reduce the 
threat of terrorism, its impact, and our vulnerability to it.  
                                                          
1 Neville Bolt, The Violent Image: Insurgent Propaganda and the New Revolutionaries (London: Hurst, 
2012), p. 18. 
The essence of strategic communications, according to one influential group of 
researchers working in management studies, is ‘communicating purposefully to advance’ an 
organisation’s mission, which seems unproblematic. But they go on to say that ‘these 
activities are strategic, not random or unintentional communications – even though 
unintended consequences of communications can adversely impact the ability of an 
organization to achieve its strategic goals. Importantly, strategic must not be defined 
narrowly’.2 In other words, for communications to be strategic they must not focus on 
particular aspects of the mission but should embrace its totality.  
Several national and multilateral counterterrorism strategies are genuinely strategic, 
recognising the need for managing risk by addressing vulnerabilities as well as threats, 
prevention as well as response, and the value of persuasion as well as coercion. The UK’s CT 
strategy, CONTEST, appears to have been the first to be articulated in such a strategic way 
(but it is by no means the only one).3 And yet, despite the prevalence of strategic approaches, 
research and practice in the communications field has not followed a similarly holistic, 
balanced and therefore strategic framework. In academia, most attention has been paid to 
communications that prevent radicalisation, and much of this is highly critical of what 
governments have practised, and while there is evidence that governments do use 
communication tools in other areas of CT, these have been subjected to much less scrutiny 
by researchers.4  
Moreover, CT communications needs to pay attention to all forms of communication 
used directly and indirectly by terrorists – mainstream and social media, images, music, 
                                                          
2 Kirk Hallahan et al., ‘Defining Strategic Communication’, International Journal of Strategic 
Communication (Vol. 1, No. 1, 2007), pp. 4, 27. 
3 HM Government, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, Cm 9608 
(London: The Stationery Office, 2018). Some national and multilateral counter-terrorism strategies 
have been modelled on the UK’s, such as the EU’s strategy (2005) and Nigeria’s (2014). For 
discussions of these strategies, see Rik Coolsaet, ‘EU counterterrorism strategy: value added or 
chimera?’, International affairs (Vol. 86 No. 4, 2010), pp. 857-873 and Eugene Eji, ‘Rethinking 
Nigeria’s counter-terrorism strategy’, The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public 
Affairs (Vol. 18, No.3, 2016, pp. 198-220. 
4 See, for example, Jack Holland, ‘The Language of Counterterrorism’ in Richard Jackson (ed.), Routledge 
Handbook of Critical Terrorism Studies (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 203-13, and Bill Durodie, ‘Securitising 
education to prevent terrorism or losing direction?’, British Journal of Educational Studies (Vol. 64 No.1, 2016), 
pp. 21-35. For a rare example of a study examining CT strategy holistically through a communications lens, see 
Ronald D. Crelinsten, ‘Analysing terrorism and counter-terrorism: A communication model’, Terrorism and 
Political Violence (Vol. 14 No.2, 2002), pp. 77-122. 
videos, and writing, and actions as well as representation. 19th century anarchists saw 
terrorism as ‘propaganda of the deed’,5 while in the age of the terrorist ‘spectacular’, in 1974 
Brian Jenkins famously equated terrorism with theatre: terrorists’ acts, words and images are 
all part of their communications.6 Furthermore, it is not simply a question of recognising that 
terrorist attacks and terrorist propaganda are different forms of communication: terrorists 
have many things to say to many different groups of people: ‘Mistakenly, terrorist acts are 
widely assumed, at best, to be a “one message fits all” form of address’.7 Terrorists 
communicate using a wide variety of mediums including video games, poetry, songs, murals, 
oral narratives and more.8 
This article seeks to make two important contributions to the field. The first is a 
reconceptualisation of how the role of ‘strategic communications’ within CT policy is 
understood. The article argues that what is largely perceived as ‘strategic communications’ 
within policy and practice is rarely strategic in its nature; instead, communications tends to 
be seen as an ‘add-on’ to CT policy. But strategic communications, in order to actually be 
strategic, should be at the core of any CT strategy, as a thread that runs through all aspects 
of it.  
Second, in large part because of this misconceptualisation, strategic communications 
has too often been reduced in the eyes of policymakers to purely ‘counternarrative’ or 
‘counter-messaging’ campaigns. As we shall argue, strategic communications has largely been 
confined to the preventative sphere of CT policy – countering terrorist attempts at 
radicalisation and recruitment. This article argues that strategic communications has 
applications across the whole of CT policy. Through an analysis of the four pillars of the UK 
CONTEST strategy, the wider application of strategic communications is demonstrated, 
                                                          
5 Propaganda of the deed ‘is planned dramaturgically with precision, rendering it primarily strategic. 
For propaganda of the deed to become a fully-fledged act of communication requires viewers. A 
tank that explodes under insurgent fire is a military tactical strike. But place a camera before it, and 
it becomes strategic propaganda of the deed. See Bolt, The Violent Image, p. 3. 
6 Brian M. Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 1974) p.4. 
7 Bolt, The Violent Image, p. 258. 
8 See, for example, Thomas Hegghammer (ed.), Jihadi Culture: The Art and Social Practices of 
Militant Islamists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
highlighting promising avenues of exploration within each CONTEST pillar where strategic 
communications can deliver added value. 
 
CONTEST: The UK’s Counterterrorism Strategy  
The aim of CONTEST is ‘to reduce the risk to the UK and its citizens and interests overseas 
from terrorism, so that our people can go about their lives freely and with confidence’.9 In 
order to achieve this, the strategy is structured around four pillars:  
 Prevent: Safeguard and support vulnerable people to stop them from becoming 
terrorists or supporting terrorism;  
 Pursue: Stop terrorist attacks happening in the UK and threatening UK interests 
overseas; 
 Protect: Strengthen protection against a terrorist attack in the UK or UK interests 
overseas; 
 Prepare: Save lives, reduce harm and aid recovery quickly in the event of a terrorist 
attack. 
CONTEST was most recently updated in June 2018 following a review. Despite widespread 
agreement over the potential of strategic communications for counterterrorism, CONTEST 
has little to say on the topic. Within the 100-page document, ‘strategic communications’ is 
only mentioned twice. The first is in reference to the need to counter terrorist narratives10 
and the second an acknowledgement of Daesh’s successful strategic communications 
campaigns online.11 Beyond this, the role of communications in general is discussed in a 
limited number of places across the pillars, most prominently within the Prevent pillar, 
highlighting the need to disrupt the spread of terrorist propaganda online and to develop 
strong counternarratives.12 The last three pillars all note the importance of public-awareness 
campaigns, highlighting the Action Counters Terrorism (ACT) campaign encouraging members 
of the public to report suspicious behaviour (Pursue);13 the British Transport Police’s ‘See it. 
                                                          
9 HM Government, CONTEST, p. 7. 
10 HM Government, CONTEST, p. 71.  
11 HM Government, CONTEST, p. 74. 
12 HM Government, CONTEST, p. 71. 
13 HM Government, CONTEST, p. 46. 
Say it. Sorted’ campaign to raise vigilance on the rail network (Protect);14 and the ‘Run, Hide, 
Tell’ campaign of practical advice for what to do in the event of a terrorist attack (Prepare).15 
The discussion of communications in parts rather than holistically is far from the strategic 
application of communications. However, as we will show, the value of communications is 
implicit in much of CONTEST, but it requires close reading and contextual knowledge to 
appreciate this. 
 
The Prevent Pillar 
The Prevent pillar’s aim is ‘to safeguard and support vulnerable people to stop them from 
becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism’.16 Preventing the recruitment and radicalisation 
of potential terrorists has been the major focus of strategic communications efforts in 
CT/CVE. Indeed, a glance at the published literature would suggest it has been an almost 
exclusive focus: strategic communications in CT/CVE is widely assumed to be preventative.17 
This is illustrated by the prevalence of so-called counternarrative or counter-speech in policy 
prescriptions, CVE handbooks and government and non-government interventions. Although 
counternarrative and counter-speech can be distinguished from strategic communications – 
the former seeks to delegitimise terrorist propaganda and/or offer a more positive 
alternative, sometimes (but not always) in narrative form, while the latter is usually seen as 
an organisation’s use of the full range of communications channels to achieve a strategic 
objective18 – the terms are sometimes used interchangeably and both counternarrative and 
counter-speech, when practised by governments, may be seen as a component of CT/CVE 
strategic communications.  
                                                          
14 HM Government, CONTEST, p. 58. 
15 HM Government, CONTEST, p. 68. 
16 HM Government, CONTEST, p. 31. 
17 See, for example, Haroro J Ingram, ‘Deciphering The Siren Call of Militant Islamist Propaganda: 
Meaning, Credibility and Behavioural Change’, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The 
Hague 7, No. 9, 2016. 
18 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Memorandum of Understanding on Project Funding’, 2016, 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil
e/696952/Memorandum_of_Understanding_on_Project_Funding.pdf>; Henry Tuck and Tanya 
Silverman, ‘The Counter Narrative Countering Violent Extremism Handbook’, Institute for Strategic 
Dialogue, <https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Counter-narrative-
Handbook_1.pdf>, accessed 18 December 2019. Content removal and other methods to restrict 
access to terrorist content is not considered to be within the scope of this article.  
The definitional scope of these terms is important. The potential of strategic 
communications to prevent radicalisation and recruitment cannot be understood without 
attending to the range of activities implied by these two terms. The published literature on 
CT/CVE communications, at least in the West, focuses overwhelmingly on the use of 
interventions to challenge terrorist ideology and propaganda by ‘[e]ngaging in the battle of 
ideas – challenging the ideologies that extremists believe can justify the use of violence, 
primarily by helping Muslims who wish to dispute these ideas to do so’.19 This emphasis is 
largely a response to the popular and political anxiety in Western countries at the capacity of 
jihadist groups, in particular, to recruit and radicalise through online propaganda despite a 
wealth of research which shows that the internet may be an enabler of radicalisation and 
recruitment, but is rarely the principal cause of behavioural change.20 For this reason, 
academic research tends to be sceptical about the efficacy of counternarrative or counter-
speech, both on the grounds of its theoretical underpinning and on what is known about its 
actual effect.21 Communications theory suggests that violent words do not necessarily lead to 
violent deeds, that people are not so susceptible that they can be ‘inoculated’ by consuming 
communications products, and that a message or a narrative can simply be countered by 
another.22 In the field of CVE, counter-narrative interventions, meanwhile, are notoriously 
lacking in independent evaluation, with authors often proudly citing ‘vanity metrics’ such as 
numbers of views on YouTube or ‘likes’ on Facebook.23   
The most infamous example of an unsuccessful counter-speech campaign is the US 
State Department’s ‘Think Again Turn Away’ social media campaign in 2013–14, which was 
widely criticised for drawing attention to the terrorists’ material while making the US 
                                                          
19 HM Government, ‘Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy’, Cm 6888, 
July 2006, p. 2. 
20 Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Nick Kaderbhai, Research Perspectives on Online 
Radicalisation: A Literature Review 2006–2016 (Dublin: VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2017); 
Ghaffar Hussain and Erin Marie Saltman, Jihad Trending: A Comprehensive Analysis of Online 
Extremism and How to Counter It (London: Quilliam Foundation, 2014), pp. 13–17. 
21 Kate Ferguson, ‘Countering Violent Extremism Through Media and Communication Strategies: A 
Review of the Evidence’, Partnership for Conflict, Crime and Security Research, 1 March 2016. 
22 Cristina Archetti, Understanding Terrorism in the Age of Global Media: A Communication Approach 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 179. 
23 Louis Reynolds and Henry Tuck, ‘The Counter-Narrative Monitoring and Evaluation Handbook’ 
(London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2016), p. 24. 
government appear leaden and amateurish by comparison.24 In one example, the State 
Department replied to a leader of the Al-Nusra Front in Syria with a taunt about Islamic State’s 
ethics, apparently unaware that the Al-Nusra Front was engaged in a violent feud with Islamic 
State.25  Other counter-speech interventions, such as Saudi Arabia’s Sakinah initiative, in 
which religious scholars working for the Ministry of Islamic Affairs engaged potentially 
vulnerable individuals on the internet to undermine extremist ideology and promote 
‘moderate’ interpretations of Islam.26 And there is such a wealth of counternarrative material 
that Hedayah, the Abu Dhabi-based international centre of excellence for CVE, has developed 
an online library devoted to it.27 What is lacking is compelling evidence of positive effect of 
what has so far been attempted.  
Even within the Prevent pillar, strategic communication in CT/CVE means more than 
counternarrative or counter-speech. What distinguishes strategic communication from any 
other type of communication is its strategic aim, and the Prevent pillar’s aim is to reduce 
recruitment and radicalisation). But strategic communications are not limited by form (such 
as narrative or message), audience (terrorists, vulnerable individuals, the public), or medium 
(social media, television broadcast, parliamentary statement). A broader view, therefore, of 
strategic communications in Prevent might include campaigns that go beyond social media, 
that seek to influence a much broader range of audience, and which are not focused on 
undermining or replacing terrorist ideological material. What, then, might such 
communications include? 
For a start, given that terrorist radicalisation and recruitment is a highly variable but 
usually complex and multi-factorial process of socialisation, strategic communications 
interventions could attend to what James Khalil and Martine Zeuthen call ‘structural factors’ 
of radicalisation and recruitment (otherwise known as ‘push factors’, such as political and 
economic grievances), as well as ‘enabling factors’ (for example, channels of communication 
via social media) and ‘individual incentives’ (things which attract individuals to a violent group 
                                                          
24 Clive Walker and Maura Conway, ‘Online Terrorism and Online Laws’, Dynamics of Asymmetric 
Conflict (Vol. 8, No. 2, 2015), p. 169. 
25 Rita Katz, ‘The State Department's Twitter war with ISIS is embarrassing’, Time Magazine, 16 September 
2014.  
26 Christopher Boucek, ‘The Sakinah Campaign and Internet Counter-Radicalization in Saudi Arabia’, 
CTC Sentinel (Vol. 1, No. 9, 2008), pp. 1–3. 
27 Hedayah, ‘Counter Narratives Library’. 
or cause, such as the appeal of charismatic ideologues or financial incentives).28 Adding 
further categories to the recruitment/radicalisation model, strategic communications might 
also attend to group dynamics (for example, socialisation processes) and, on the 
countervailing side of the process, to protective factors (sources of individual or community 
resilience, such as supportive social environments).  
To illustrate, governments could look to mitigate the effect of economic and political 
grievances and other structural factors, seek to undermine the charismatic (as opposed to 
ideological) appeal of terrorist recruiters, undermine terrorist group cohesion, and promote 
protective factors (including what is sometimes called ‘individual resilience’), for example by 
promoting sources of advice and support within communities. Preventive strategic 
communications could also address audiences beyond those judged vulnerable to 
radicalisation, such as opinion-formers and wielders of cultural influence, to reduce social and 
community tensions. And strategic communications campaigns need not restrict themselves 
to social media.  
Furthermore, for a communications campaign to be truly strategic, it needs to be 
integrated with wider government communication and action, and there is evidence that a 
lack of organisational coherence is one rapid route to ineffectiveness.29 Even a positive, well-
managed communications intervention may be undermined or even become 
counterproductive if it is not congruent with other messages.30 And perhaps most 
importantly, given the evidence that direct challenges are at best ineffective at achieving 
positive behaviour change and may even be counter-productive, prevention of terrorism 
should not be focused on ideological confrontation.31  
One important strand of recent terrorism research approaches the problem within the 
framework of public health interventions, dividing responses into: treatment of offenders; 
active interventions targeted at ‘vulnerable’ or ‘at-risk’ populations; and public campaigns 
                                                          
28 James Khalil and Martine Zeuthen, ‘Countering Violent Extremism and Risk Reduction: A Guide to 
Programme Design and Evaluation’, RUSI Whitehall Report 2016, p. 9. 
29 Haroro J Ingram, ‘A Brief History of Propaganda During Conflict: Lessons for Counter-Terrorism 
Strategic Communications’, ICCT Research Paper, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), 
June 2016. 
30 Paul Cornish, Julian Lindley-French and Claire Yorke, ‘Strategic Communications and National Strategy’ 
(London: Chatham House, 2011), p. 14.  
31 Kate Ferguson, ‘Countering Violent Extremism Through Media and Communication Strategies: A 
Review of the Evidence’, Partnership for Conflict, Crime and Security Research, 1 March 2016, p. 15. 
designed to sensitise the general population to the risks and to ‘reduce the incidence of risky 
behaviours or to promote social causes important to the betterment of the community’.32 
Public health interventions in the latter category are primarily communicative, and evidence 
for their effectiveness can be found in campaigns to reduce smoking or cut down on sugar 
and fat.33 And yet the application of this type of model to terrorism has focused particularly 
on the second category (generally equated to preventing and countering violent extremism, 
or P/CVE), and there is a striking lack of insights from public health communications in the 
academic literature on terrorism. 
Despite the restricted focus on counternarrative and counter-speech in the literature, 
there are signs that some governments have in fact taken a broader view. Most notably, the 
UK’s Home Office created the Research Information Communications Unit (RICU) in 2007, 
with a broad mandate to improve government communications about terrorism.34 After the 
election of the coalition government in 2010, RICU refocused its attention on counter-
radicalisation, drawing criticism from academics in the ‘critical terrorism studies’ tradition 
(which critically evaluates the theory and practice of counterterrorism rather than focusing 
on terrorism) for allegedly propagandising deceptively, creating suspect communities and 
inappropriately importing the techniques of counter-insurgency practiced abroad in the War 
on Terror to the domestic sphere.35  
In the Middle East, the increase in terrorist attacks following the 2003 invasion and 
occupation of Iraq led to a range of communications interventions, some apparently 
supported by the US government, that included the use of public service advertisements to 
strengthen ties between Iraq’s ethnic and confessional groups – especially between Sunnis 
and Shiites, at exactly the time that Al-Qa’ida was seeking to foment inter-community 
violence in Iraq. The evidence suggests this campaign was not successful, possibly due to poor 
design and a failure by its authors to understand the complex socio-political context of Iraq, 
                                                          
32 Hallahan et al., ‘Defining Strategic Communication’, pp. 5–6. 
33 Magdalena Cismaru and Anne M Lavack, ‘Social Marketing Campaigns Aimed at Preventing and Controlling 
Obesity: A Review and Recommendations’, International Review on Public and Non Profit Marketing (Vol. 4, 
No.1-2, 2007), pp. 9-30. 
34 Rachel Briggs, ‘Community Engagement for Counterterrorism: Lessons from the United Kingdom’, 
International Affairs (Vol. 86, No. 4, July 2010), pp. 979–80.  
35 Rizwaan Sabir, ‘Blurred Lines and False Dichotomies: Integrating Counterinsurgency into the UK’s 
Domestic “War on Terror”’, Critical Social Policy (Vol. 37 No. 2, 2017), pp. 202–24. 
but it illustrates the point that communication in the Prevent pillar need not be restricted to 
challenging terrorist propaganda.36      
 
The Pursue Pillar 
The Pursue pillar – to stop terrorist attacks happening in the UK and against UK interests 
overseas37 – encompasses the tools and approaches of more hard-edged counterterrorism – 
essentially the use of the criminal justice system, intelligence agencies and the military to 
capture (or kill) terrorists, bring them to justice, and to disrupt terrorist operations and 
networks through pre-emptive intelligence and law enforcement.38  
At first glance this may not seem to be promising territory for communications 
interventions, strategic or otherwise, which are concerned with influencing and persuading. 
However, this overlooks that strategic communications approaches have been widely applied 
in conflicts by military forces – going back at least as far as the Malayan Emergency (1948–
60), during which General Sir Gerald Templer, who led the British counterinsurgency response 
as High Commissioner in Malaya from 1952 to 1954, said: ‘The answer lies not in pouring 
more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people’.39  
CT is not the same thing as counterinsurgency (COIN), but they have enough in 
common for similar strategic communications approaches to be applied to both. Indeed, 
terrorists themselves recognise the similarities between (counter)terrorism and 
(counter)insurgency and the centrality of strategic communications to both: most famously, 
Al Qa’ida leader’s Ayman al-Zawahiri echoed Templer in his advice in 2005 to Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, then commander of Al Qa’ida in Iraq, to remember that ‘we are in a battle, and that 
                                                          
36 Ahmed K Al-Rawi, ‘The Anti-Terrorist Advertising Campaigns in the Middle East’, Journal of 
International Communication (Vol. 19, No. 2, 2013), pp. 182–95.  
37 HM Government, CONTEST, p. 43. 
38 Basia Spalek and Doug Weeks, ‘Counterterrorism Measures’, In Bryan S Turner (ed.), The Wiley‐
Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social Theory (Wiley, 2017), pp. 111. 
39 This sentiment was later converted by an anonymous US officer during the Vietnam War into the 
more famous aside, ‘Grab ‘em by the balls and their hearts and minds will follow’, both quoted in 
Paul Dixon, ‘“Hearts and Minds”? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq’, Journal of 
Strategic Studies (Vol. 32 No. 3, 2009), p. 354. 
more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in 
a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma [the Muslim nation]’.40  
Both CT and COIN are concerned with reducing the will of violent actors to fight, so 
that individuals desist or disengage, and leaders contemplate ceasefires or accept amnesties. 
In both cases communications interventions can potentially undermine morale by seeking to 
persuade actors that their cause is better pursued politically, peacefully or not at all. Studies 
of terrorist disengagement at both the organisational and the individual level suggest that 
communications interventions changed perceptions of the value of armed action changed 
and that these changes were critical to these groups’ and individuals’ decisions.41  
Communications interventions to demoralise or dissuade terrorists may conceivably 
work by suggesting that violence is counterproductive (by highlighting failures, unintended 
consequences or unintended victims, such as those from the same identity group as the 
terrorist), ineffective (for example, by reducing what former British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher famously called ‘the [terrorists’] oxygen of publicity’42, by suppressing their public 
communication or reducing the prominence of terrorism in news reporting), or futile (by 
maintaining strong and consistent messages that terrorist attacks will not achieve their 
desired objectives). As these examples suggest, the means to achieve these communication 
ends may vary, from public diplomacy to active censorship. That is not to say that all are 
necessarily successful or ethical – the British government’s widely derided attempt to 
effectively censor Sinn Féin as a means of combating the Provisional IRA in the 1990s is a case 
in point43 – but they do at least illustrate the range of possible communications interventions 
in the Pursue pillar. 
                                                          
40 Federation of American Scientists , ‘Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi’, 2005, p. 10, 
<https://fas.org/irp/news/2005/10/letter_in_english.pdf>, accessed 4 December 2019. Emphasis 
added. 
41 Mary Beth Altier et al., ‘Why They Leave: An Analysis of Terrorist Disengagement Events from 
Eighty-seven Autobiographical Accounts’, Security Studies (Vol. 26, No. 2, 2017), pp. 305–32; Tore 
Bjørgo and John Horgan (eds), Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2008). 
42 Margaret Thatcher Foundation, ‘Margaret Speech to American Bar Association’, 15 July 1985, 
<https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106096>, accessed 14 November 2019. 
43 Gary Edgerton, ‘Quelling the " Oxygen of Publicity": British Broadcasting and" the Troubles" during the 
Thatcher Years’, Journal of Popular Culture (Vol. 30 No. 1, 1996), pp. 115-131. 
Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are also concerned with the support bases 
for belligerents, and here again a strategic communications approach has the potential to 
shape the terrorists’ operating environment. Indeed, one famous description of insurgency 
differentiates it from conventional warfare by emphasising its integration within communities 
– ‘the guerrilla must swim in the people as the fish swims in the sea’.44 Not all terrorist 
movements in history have benefited from community support, but some of the most long-
lasting have, and at times even campaigns of suicide attacks have generated strong support 
from communities, as measured by opinion polls.45 It stands to reason that a terrorist 
operating in a supportive environment will benefit from practical and operational support of 
various kinds, such as funding, passive surveillance (what the Provisional IRA referred to as 
‘dicking’), and the supply of facilities such as safe houses and vehicles.  
The potential for communications interventions in Pursue is not, though, limited to 
sapping community support for terrorist causes, important though that may be operationally. 
In the West, at least, there is a long history of counterterrorist authorities promoting public 
awareness of terrorist threats and urging the public not only to be vigilant and protect 
themselves and others, but also to report any suspicions to the authorities and thereby 
provide operational leads for interdicting terrorist attacks. Public communications campaigns 
of this type have included New York’s ’16 million eyes’ campaign in 2007, which carried the 
words: ‘There are 16 million eyes in the city. We’re counting on all of them. If you see 
something, say something’, and Scotland Yard’s ‘Life Savers’ 2004 campaign, which stated: 
‘Terrorists need places to live and to make plans … they need vehicles and people to help 
them. If you have any suspicions about terrorist activity… do not hesitate … call [the] 
                                                          
44 This aphorism was attributed to Mao Tse-tung, but his more considered observation was: ‘Many 
people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy's rear. Such a belief reveals 
lack of comprehension of the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The 
former may be likened to water the latter to the fish who inhabit it’. Mao Tse-tung, translated by 
Samuel B Griffith, Mao-Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare (Eastford, CT: Martino Fine Books, 2017, first 
published 1937), Chap. 6. 
45 Mia M Bloom, ‘Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding’, 
Political Science Quarterly, (Vol. 119, No. 1, 2004), pp. 61–88; Bart Schuurman, ‘Defeated by Popular 
Demand: Public Support and Counterterrorism in Three Western Democracies, 1963–1998’, Studies 
in Conflict & Terrorism (Vol. 36, No. 2, 2013), pp. 152–75; Daniel Byman, ‘Passive Sponsors of 
Terrorism’, Survival (Vol. 47, No. 4, 2005), pp. 117–44.  
confidential anti-terrorist hotline’.46 The encouragement of what some critics call ‘citizen-
detectives’ is not without controversy, but these are clear examples of counterterrorism in 
the communication sphere which is designed to create operational opportunities. Such 
campaigns, wittingly or not, may work to counter the bystander effect – the reluctance of 
individuals to intervene in emergency situations, a phenomenon which is well known to 
psychologists.47    
Pursue pillar objectives may also be served by communications interventions that 
enhance perceptions of counterterrorist authorities in terms of legitimacy and competence. 
Many, if not most, law enforcement organisations benefit from public relations departments, 
and while there is little attention paid to this aspect of communications in the academic 
literature, it is clearly the case that terrorists themselves recognise the importance of 
delegitimising their opponents. The Syrian theorist of jihad, Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, for instance, 
wrote: ‘The enemy regime will not sit idle while we wage our political and military campaigns, 
they will initiate their own propaganda blitz and psychological warfare trying to portray us as 
a bunch of thugs, criminals and terrorists with no connection to the nation, and they will flood 
the media with rumors. The reputation of the regime should work in our favor, we should 
affix the label of “lies and liars” to them’.48 As Richard English has pointed out, maintaining 
credibility in government and law enforcement through counterterrorism communications is 
critical not only to winning ‘hearts and minds’ but also to achieving operational objectives.49  
 
The Protect Pillar 
CONTEST’s Protect pillar aims to ‘strengthen protection against a terrorist attack in the UK or 
UK interests overseas’.50 Four objectives serve this aim: to detect suspected terrorists and 
harmful material at the border; to reduce the risk and improve the resilience of transport and 
                                                          
46 Nick Vaughan-Williams, ‘Borderwork Beyond Inside/Outside? Frontex, the Citizen–Detective and 
the War on Terror’, Space and Polity (Vol. 12, No. 1, 2008), pp. 63–79. 
47 For the bystander effect and counterterrorism, see Kumar Ramakrishna, ‘The Threat of Terrorism 
and Extremism: “A Matter of ‘When’, and Not ‘If’’’, Southeast Asian Affairs, 2017, pp. 335–50. 
48 Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, ‘Lessons Learned from the Armed Jihad Ordeal in Syria’, quoted in Donald 
Holbrook, ‘Approaching Terrorist Public Relations Initiatives’, Public Relations Inquiry (Vol. 3, No. 2, 
2014), p. 154. 
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critical national infrastructure; to reduce the vulnerability of crowed places; and to prevent 
access to materials and information that could be used to conduct attacks.51  
Whilst at first glance there may appear little space for communications in a pillar that 
is largely about physical security of infrastructure, this article argues that strategic 
communications can in fact deliver added value to the Protect pillar, where strategic 
communications is relatively undeveloped. These opportunities are not without challenges, 
in particular how can vigilance campaigns be designed that do not play into terrorist hands 
by increasing public fear or overwhelming authorities with false reports. 
As the terrorist threat becomes more complex, especially with the increases in ‘lone 
actor’ or ‘inspired attacks’, the role of the public has become increasingly important. As David 
Parker and colleagues argue, ‘public coproduction of security is increasingly necessary, by 
which we mean the active engagement of private citizens and key non-security stakeholders 
(e.g., teachers) in aiding authorities in detecting, assessing, and reporting risks of violent 
extremism’.52 Some public goods, such as security and safety, cannot simply be produced by 
the state and consumed by public, rather they need to be co-produced. This is a concept that 
has informed many areas of public policy, such as policing and crime prevention, with policies 
such as Neighbourhood Watch schemes. Because the co-production of security is essentially 
voluntary, it requires encouragement or incentives to overcome inertia as well as the 
availability of information to help the public play its role – and this is where strategic 
communications has a vital role.53 
In the Protect pillar, this has most commonly manifested itself in public vigilance 
campaigns around public transport. Given the scale and dispersed nature of transport 
infrastructures, it is impossible to ensure the necessary numbers of police and security staff 
to observe all locations at all times, so the participation of passengers reporting suspicious 
behaviour or unattended items becomes invaluable. Vigilance campaigns are aimed at raising 
awareness of the threat and increasing the likelihood of members of the public reporting 
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information, such as the current British Transport Police’s ‘See it. Say it. Sorted’ campaign,54 
and the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) campaign ‘If you see something, say 
something’.55 
In the UK, vigilance campaigns have a long history, encouraging  members of the public 
to look out for and report unattended baggage, in large part due to the Provisional IRA 
bombing campaigns from the 1970s to 1990s  against, for example, the UK rail 
infrastructure.56 However, this has not been the case in other countries, such as Denmark and 
Spain, who have avoided such campaigns, fearing the unintended consequences of scaring 
the public or receiving an overwhelming number of reports.57  
As Alex Braithwaite argues, the central objective of terrorism is to provoke a sense of 
fear in the public, because this is how terrorists believe they can deliver political change. 
However, ‘if terrorists do indeed desire and require the cultivation and proliferation of public 
fear, then it would appear that such schemes [vigilance campaigns] run the potential of 
becoming counterproductive’.58 A call for vigilance against the terrorist threat, it is argued, 
will inevitably raise the threat perception and level of fear in the public. However, these 
outcomes should not be interpreted as coterminous, in other words, that increasing public 
fear is the price to pay for increasing public vigilance. Rather, the question should be how can 
communication campaigns be designed to increase vigilance while reassuring the public and 
reducing the levels of public fear? 
Although most public vigilance campaigns are designed around signs of an imminent 
attack, such as suspicious behaviour or unattended items, there is also scope for campaigns 
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that focus their attention further upstream in the attack planning cycle. For instance, there is 
usually a long prior phase in which the actors gain access to the knowledge and precursor 
materials needed to build an explosive device. Some countries, including the US and the 
Netherlands,59 have specific vigilance campaigns to raise awareness of what actions to look 
out for to prevent malignant actors from acquiring precursor materials to manufacture 
explosives. As the US DHS Bomb-Making Materials Awareness Program (BMAP) notes: 
‘Powerful explosives can be made from common consumer goods, like pool sanitizers, 
fertilizers, and paint removers, that are bought and sold every day in communities across the 
United States. With the increase in the use of these common items to make homemade 
explosives (HME) and improvised explosive devices (IED), an educated and proactive public is 
the key to prevention’.60 These campaigns have a narrower focus than public information 
campaigns on, for example, transport systems, targeting a small audience such as such 
companies and employees in the supply chain of such precursor materials, highlighting 
specific actions (such as purchasing for certain chemicals in large quantities)61. 
Such specialised campaigns offer certain advantages over general campaigns. First, 
rather than addressing a general audience with broad instructions, such as ‘be vigilant for 
suspicious activity’, these campaigns are able to target a specific audience with specific 
instructions, potentially reducing the number of false reports. Second, targeting a smaller 
audience reduces the likelihood of increasing public levels of fear of the terrorist threat. This 
raises the question of what other ‘niche’ vigilance campaigns might be viable options. 
Reflecting on other CONTEST pillar priorities for protecting critical national infrastructure 
(CNI) (beyond transport) and reducing the vulnerability of crowded places, other more 
targeted vigilance campaigns aimed at key actors, such as retail workers or bar staff working 
in high-profile public spaces, may prove effective applications of strategic communications. 
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A further role for communications within the Protect pillar is in deterrence. While 
much emphasis is placed on physical security to protect CNI, communicating these measures 
to potential hostile perpetrators can produce a deterrent effect. The objective of deterrence 
in this context is to be able to influence the potential perpetrator’s analysis and assessment 
in planning hostile action, and to make it less attractive to carry out that action.62 Although in 
strategic theory deterrence is often about the cost–benefit analysis of retaliation, within 
Protect it is about influencing the perpetrators’ assessment on whether an attack would be 
successful. As the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure explains: ‘If a hostile 
believes a site has excellent security measures due to what they’ve read online, seen on a 
poster or witnessed through their physical reconnaissance, it may be enough to deter them 
from their target altogether. This process has the added benefit of reassuring staff and 
visitors; they will feel that they are in a safer environment’.63 The success of any deterrence 
strategy rests on being able to effectively communicate the desired message to potential 
perpetrators.  
This is common practice in security and crime prevention: buildings with CCTV often 
advertise the fact with warning signs to provide a deterrence effect.64 Similarly, 
Neighbourhood Watch groups often advertise their presence to potential criminal 
perpetrators. However, using strategic communication techniques to provide deterrence has 
been largely overlooked within CT strategy. In CONTEST deterrence is seen largely through 
the lens of the Pursue pillar, through the investigation, disruption and prosecution of terrorist 
activities. However, for many ideologically motivated terrorists, prosecution is not an 
effective deterrence, while deterrence by communicating the unlikelihood of success may 
prove more effective. Further, a deterrence strategy is a pro-active approach that seeks to 
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shape the behaviour of potential attackers, which can provide a less resource-intensive 
addition to the CT toolkit, compared to conventional Protect pillar strategies 
Such a deterrence strategy has two potential pitfalls. The first is that rather than 
deterring potential perpetrators, too much information is communicated, allowing them to 
take steps to circumvent the protective features in place. The second is displacement: that 
the deterrence effect is successful and leads to the unintended consequence of terrorist 
actors changing targets and identifying less protected and more vulnerable targets. However, 
while displacement does exist, research has shown that in practice the displacement to more 
vulnerable targets is relatively rare.65 
Strategic communications has an important role to play within the Protect pillar. 
Beyond the role of traditional vigilance campaigns, there is scope for more targeted 




The Prepare Pillar 
CONTEST describes the role of the Prepare pillar as to ‘save lives, reduce harm and aid 
recovery quickly in the event of a terrorist attack’.66 How can strategic communications can 
add to the delivery of these aims?  
As terrorism is not simply violence but also the communication of violence (or threat 
of violence) to a target audience, the immediate victims are not the ultimate recipient of the 
communication. Instead, violence is used to communicate a message to a wider audience, to 
‘terrorise’ enemies or to motivate and encourage potential supporters. Traditionally, CT/CVE 
strategic communications have focused on ‘upstream’ challenges, such as preventing 
radicalisation and recruitment. Once a terrorist attack has taken place, it is clearly too late to 
ensure any preventative action. However, as the attack itself is only a means to an end, it is 
possible to interrupt or influence the communication of this event and its impact on intended 
audiences, and the Prepare pillar suggests a need to develop a ‘downstream’ communication 
strategy to counter the impact and harm caused by terrorist incidents. Ultimately, since it is 
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impossible to prevent every attack, it is only prudent to be prepared to mitigate the impact 
of a terrorist attack in its aftermath.67 
Alastair Reed and Haroro J Ingram have argued for the importance of viewing terrorist 
incidents through the lens of ‘meaning formation’ (or ‘public sense-making’).68 It is in the 
space following a terrorist incident that individuals interpret and give meaning to what they 
have just experienced, a process that tends to peak as the initial shock response to the attack 
subsides.69 How these events are perceived and interpreted by the public, and the meaning 
subsequently assigned to them, will inevitably in part determine the social harm and impact 
of the event.70 For example, if an attack is aimed at terrorising a given audience, the success 
of this objective will depend on how this audience processes the event and the meaning they 
assign to it. This process is not passive and is influenced by the context and communications 
received by the audience. Hence, in the post-incident space, terrorist groups normally aim to 
shape the narrative through their communications strategy to maximise the attack’s impact. 
However, this also opens up the opportunity for communications interventions to counter 
the terrorists’ meaning generation and thereby minimise the impact on the audience.  
However, in the post-incident space it is not just terrorists who aim to shape and 
manipulate the narrative, and there is unlikely to be a straightforward contest between the 
terrorists and the security authorities in public sense-making. The aftermath of any attack 
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may see multiple actors seeking to exploit the communication space, demonstrating the 
importance of developing and implementing post-incident communication campaigns. 
In the period during or following a terrorist incident, the first actors seeking to ‘frame’71 the 
event and shape the emerging narrative are usually the terrorists themselves. In the age of 
the terrorist ‘spectacular’, when terrorists sought to capture attention through exposure via 
mass media (particularly television), target selection and operational planning would have 
been focused on visual or dramatic impact. The 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington 
were major examples of terrorist spectaculars, but they came from a long line of highly 
dramatic and carefully staged attacks going back to attacks on aircraft in the early 1970s and 
on iconic buildings in the 1980s and 1990s. For example the Black September Munich 
Olympics  attack (1972)72; the bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut (1983),the 
downing of Pam Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland (1988), or the dual bombings of the 
US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (1998)73 However, with the emergence of social 
media and smart phones, members of the public are able to capture the events or the 
immediate aftermath, with video footage from mobile phones quickly spreading online or 
being amplified by broadcast on traditional media.74 One of the first such ‘viral’ attacks was 
the brutal murder of British soldier Lee Rigby in Woolwich in 2013. His attackers did not flee 
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the scene but sought out passers-by to film their justification of the attack (whilst still holding 
the murder weapons with their hands covered in blood).75  
Terrorists can also direct the social media communication of attacks. The Somalia-
based militant group Al-Shabaab, for instance, ‘live tweeted’ their marauding attack in 
Nairobi’s Westgate shopping mall in 201376. Al-Shabaab’s version overwhelmed the 
government’s attempts to control meaning formation and enabled them to dominate the 
public sense-making.77 The horrific events of the Christchurch mosque attack in New Zealand 
in March 2019, livestreamed using Facebook Live, took terrorist self-coverage to new heights 
and a wider audience. The perpetrator’s extensive preparations ensured that the video of the 
attack and his justifying manifesto would go viral.78 Social media platforms struggled in the 
immediate aftermath to prevent the posting of the video – Facebook alone reported it being 
uploaded 1.5 million times to its platform in the 24 hours after the attack.79 The sheer volume 
of the uploads brings home not only the scale of the challenge faced by tech companies, but 
also the complex and integrated media ecosystem in which the material was disseminated 
and the current limits to AI systems for spotting and removing such events. Following this 
tragic event, the ‘Christchurch Call to Action’, led by New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda 
Ardern, highlighted the need for governments and tech companies to work together ‘to 
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respond rapidly, effectively and in a coordinated manner to the dissemination of terrorist or 
violent extremist content following a terrorist event’.80 
Importantly, however, it is not only the actors that carried out the attack that seek to 
control the emerging narrative for their own ends. Frequently, other extremist groups quickly 
emerge to exploit the events for their own agenda. In the aftermath of the attack on Lee 
Rigby, British far-right organisation the English Defence League (EDL) were quick to exploit 
the attack, tweeting in the hours after the attack:  [quote] 
 
@Official_EDL: ****Confirmed we have been subject to a terror attack by Islam, we 
are currently under attack**** (18:06)81 
[end quote] 
 
In their work analysing the social media response to the attack, Colin Roberts and 
colleagues highlighted: ‘Two features of this message are important to tease out. First, there 
is a collectivization of the threat by invoking that it is “we” who have been attacked, not just 
the victim. Second, there is an attribution to “Islam” rather than just the two suspects’.82 The 
EDL exploited the attack as a means to galvanise existing supporters and to reach out to new 
supporters, but also framed the event to justify retaliatory action.83 These tweets were 
quickly followed up by others seeking to mobilise supporters on the ground: [quote] 
 
@Official_EDL: EDL leader Tommy Robinson on way to Woolwich now, Take to the 
streets peeps ENOUGH IS ENOUGH (18:26)84 
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@Official_EDL: Message from Tommy—Feet on the streets anyone want to go to 
Woolwich contact him/me, he will be there around 9pm (18:59) 
[end quote] 
 
By 9 o’clock that evening there were EDL members on the streets of Woolwich 
demonstrating and throwing bottles and stones at the police85. In the wake of the attack, 
‘retaliatory’ acts took place against mosques and Islamic centres across the UK, including 
arson, explosives devices and graffiti.86 Online, the attack was followed by a marked spike in 
cyberhate.87 These post-incident reactions are not unusual: numerous studies have shown 
that jihadist terrorist attacks are often followed by a spike in Islamophobic hate speech and 
physical violence.88 Such retaliatory violence after a terrorist attack is highly influenced by the 
dynamics of meaning generation in the wake of the attack.89 Hence, there is potential for 
post-incident communications campaigns to influence meaning generation in a way to 
minimise follow-on violence. One study has highlighted the absence of a spike in reported 
hate incidents following the Westminster Bridge attack in March 2017, attributing this in part 
to the Metropolitan Police’s implementation of their National 14-Day Plan (terror incident 
response plan90), for the first time and called for all police forces to develop similar response 
plans.91  
Another category of communications actor is those who, by accident or design, spread 
rumours, conspiracies or misinformation. Terrorist attacks are often followed by various 
conspiracy theory claims: an hour after the Westminster Bridge attack, for example, ‘twitter 
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was flooded with conspiracy theories that the entire event had been ‘spoofed’, was a ‘false 
flag’, a hoax or staged incident’.92 In the wake of the Woolwich attack, conspiracy theories 
circulated on the internet, ‘that Fusilier Rigby’s murder was plotted by MI5 to encite [sic] 
Islamaphobia in Britain’.93 At their core, conspiracy theories often latch onto the inevitable 
discrepancies in early reports or connect unrelated facts and build them into an elaborate 
theory, which is then presented as ‘the truth’. 
Whilst rumours and conspiracies are not new, social media as a medium of 
dissemination and amplification has added to their potency. Traditional media historically 
functioned as ‘gatekeepers’ in the circulation of information, usually (but of course not 
always) filtering out the unverified and obviously false. Social media is now a central part of 
the media ecosystem and can facilitate the unabated flow of such claims.94 The issue of 
misinformation95 has allegedly become such a problem following mass shootings that Google 
has had to amend its algorithm to compensate, by increasing ‘the weight of “authority”’ in 
the rankings so that high-quality information is returned rather than misinformation in the 
critical time period.96 
As well as playing an important role in meaning generation, disinformation and 
misinformation can play a disruptive role in ongoing incidents and during emergency services’ 
responses. Following the 2017 Manchester Arena bombing, a rumour circulated across social 
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media of an active shooter at the local Oldham hospital. As a result, ambulances and fire 
services were held back at the cordon while the rumour was investigated, ultimately delaying 
them reaching the victims.97 
Perhaps the most worrying trend is that of foreign influence campaigns targeting the 
post-incident communications space. These seek to interfere with and manipulate the 
communication flows to influence the meaning generation phase to serve a hostile political 
agenda. In particular, evidence has emerged of Russian influence campaigns at work during 
the 2017 terrorist attacks in the UK98: Martin Innes and colleagues identified 47 fake social 
media accounts that were active in the aftermath of four terrorist attacks and which 
attempted to ‘influence and interfere in the public debate’.99 In what appears to be a notable 
example of Russian influence, social media ‘sock puppets’ were used in the wake of the 
Westminster Bridge attack in a sophisticated attempt to drive polarisation. The now infamous 
image of a Muslim woman walking over Westminster Bridge apparently (but incorrectly) 
ignoring victims as they were being treated, soon became an internet ‘meme’. The dispute 
over the correct meaning of this image was influenced and amplified by fake social media 
accounts, apparently created in Russia, which participated in a synchronised campaign 
pushing opposing commentaries to create and drive polarisation.100 For example, one fake 
account, @Ten_GOP, forwarded the image accompanied by the comments: ‘She is being 
judged for her own actions & lack of sympathy. Would you just walk by? Or offer help?’. In 
contrast, a second fake account, @Crystal1Johnson, pushed the narrative ‘so this is how a 
world with glasses of hate look like - poor woman, being judged only by her clothes’.101 These 
actions were essentially designed to attempt to manufacture polarisation within the wider 
public debate in the wake of the attack. 
                                                          
97 Innes et al., ‘From Minutes to Months’, p. 33. 
98 Westminster, Manchester Arena, London Bridge and Finsbury Park. 
99 Martin Innes, ‘Russian Influence and Interference Measures Following the 2017 UK Terrorist 
Attacks’, Policy Brief prepared for Cardiff University Crime and Security Research Institute, Centre 
for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST), 2017, p. 1, 
<https://crestresearch.ac.uk/download/4397/>, accessed 16 December 2019. 
100 Innes, ‘Russian Influence and Interference Measures Following the 2017 UK Terrorist Attacks’, p. 
4. 
101 Innes, ‘Russian Influence and Interference Measures Following the 2017 UK Terrorist Attacks’, p. 
3. 
The level of social harm and the impact of a terrorist attack is in part determined by 
the public sense making or meaning generation after the event. This process of perception 
and interpretation can be influenced by both benevolent and malignant actors. Given that 
multiple malign actors are often active in shaping the narrative in the aftermath of a terrorist 
attack to suit their own agendas, it is crucial that governments do not surrender this 
communication space and thereby lose control of the public narrative. In order to ensure this 
does not happen it is crucial the government’s strategic communications includes planning 
for a post-attack response. 
 
Conclusions 
This article has set out to demonstrate how strategic communications has much to add to an 
effective counterterrorism strategy. Strategic communications, as it is currently applied 
within UK counterterrorism policy, is largely within the Prevent pillar of the CONTEST strategy. 
However, strategic communications has a much broader application and the potential to 
make significant contributions across the four pillars of the CONTEST strategy. 
A review of CONTEST to incorporate a greater involvement of strategic 
communications is recommended. However, this should not be done piecemeal, with 
scattered ad-hoc additions of strategic communications to individual aspects of CONTEST. The 
important point about strategic communications, which is often forgotten, is that is meant to 
be strategic. In order to do this, and to ensure its greatest impact, strategic communications 
needs to be an integral part of the overall CT strategy. To be strategic, it cannot simply be 
added on to a few individual aspects, it needs to be applied across the totality of the CT 
strategy. After all, as communication is central to terrorism, it is inevitable that strategic 
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